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Law's Non-Existent Empire
JEANNE L. SCHROEDER & DAVID GRAY CARLSON*
Anticipating the fall of the Berlin wall by over a decade and fore-
seeing the absence of a left social program, Critical Legal Studies
(CLS), to its credit, lost faith in policy science and instead has pursued a
program of liberation. This is a perfectly fine (though upper-middle-
class) program. According to Hegel, it is the only program history has
ever had. According to Hegel, in the ancient "oriental" monarchies, only
one man was free-the king. In Greece, a few were free-the elite citi-
zens of the polis. But in modernity, everyone is free.' In Hegel's view,
history is based on this very teleology.
Probably the salient theorist of liberation in American legal aca-
demics is Pierre Schlag. His observations of the legal scene are very
acute. For this, he well deserves this remarkable festschrift in his honor,
and we are honored to participate in it.
We will argue, however, that Schlag's critique is only half-correct.
Descriptively, it is excellent. He has intuited precisely what law "is"-
non-existent. Normatively, however, the critique is contradictory. In
this paper we address the normative contradictions. We believe Schlag
has failed to follow the logic of his ideas to their ultimate conclusion.
Normativity still lives and reigns in the work of Schlag himself. Only
when it is finally gone can we count our gains.
In this paper, we first give a brief description of Schlag' s critique of
policy science and show that this critique, while partially true, ultimately
fails to be thoroughgoing enough. We then discuss how a Lacanian
analysis can take Schlag's analysis a few more steps toward the goal of
completely abolishing normativity.
I. NORMATIVITY
As suggested by the title of his article, Normative and Nowhere to
Go, Schlag is critical of normativity in legal scholarship.2 In describing
the normative project, Schlag writes: "Typically, it takes some truly
wonderful normative value, like justice or liberty or equality or
whatever, and then tries its damnedest to give the abstract value a con-
* Professors of Law, The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New
York City.
1. See Peter Singer, Hegel, in GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS 124-38 (Keith Thomas ed., 1997).
2. See generally Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167
(1990).
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tent that is as determinate and concrete, and yet as encompassing, as
possible."3
In short, the fault is reasoning from a subjective "ought" to an
objective "is." Schlag does not merely predict the imminent doom of
such endeavors; that doom, Schlag thinks, is here: "The normative juris-
prudential world is about to crash. More accurately, it has already
crashed, and it is just a matter of time before the entire legal academy
takes notice."4
But wait! The apocalypse is not present after all:
Indeed, it is one of the vexations of the condition in the legal acad-
emy, as elsewhere, that various kinds of thought remain socially and
institutionally operative (in fact dominant) long after their intellectual
vitality has dissipated. And so it is with normative legal thought. It
remains socially and institutionally operative within the legal acad-
emy, though it is a jurisprudential world that has already crashed.5
Why has normative legal scholarship cheated its fate and sustained
itself after death? Because of a de-centered bureaucracy whose interest
demands that normative legal scholarship be perpetuated: "It now
becomes evident that the value (if any) of normative legal thought
depends on a decentered economy of bureaucratic institutions and prac-
tices . . . that define and represent their own operations, their own char-
acter, their own performances, in the normative currency. '"6
This bureaucracy fears freedom. Yet bureaucracy is clever. It uses
the language of freedom to fight freedom. Normative legal thought is a
technique of rhetorical manipulation by which the language of freedom
is used to disguise a fundamental fear of freedom. As a result "the 'free-
dom' word doesn't mean much of anything.... [F]reedom's just another
word for getting you to do something you don't want to do."7
Yet, when we read Schlag, we find that he inadvertently addresses
the very questions he insists must not even be posed: "What should we
do? What's the point?" . . . "If normative legal thought isn't going any-
where, what should we do instead?" "What do you propose?" "What's
the solution?"8
Schlag calls these questions an "interruption" from what the task at
hand should be-deconstruction of the very project of normative legal
scholarship.
3. PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL MIND 19 (1996) [hereinafter SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW].
4. Id. at 31.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 34.
7. Id. at 33.
8. Id. at 26-27.
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Yet, in spite of this apparent opposition to normativity, we find that
Schlag is himself normative. His program is that we should stop being
normative. This is as much normativity as the normativity he attacks.
In fact, we believe that Schlag's attack on legal academics and the
legal profession generally is a mere by-product of the main point: an
attack on law as such.9 Accordingly, Schlag blames the law for failing
to deliver what it promises-a "robust referent."' 0 Instead of delivering
this robust referent, law instead proffers a chain of signifiers (which
Schlag calls "ontological entities""). Each signifier disappointingly
refers only to other signifiers. None of these signifiers is a robust refer-
ent. Schlag reveals that law is a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing.
It literally does not exist. Law engages in the petty pace of infinite
regress-a bad infinity-without ever reaching the ultimate signified.IZ
For this reason, law is pseudoscience, nonsense, madness, "faked, bluf-
fed, or simulated."' 3
The core of this attack on law is well taken. Law is a fiction, as
Bentham 4 and Lacan 15 have strongly emphasized. But what is the nor-
mative payoff to this observation? Schlag ends one of his books by
tentatively suggesting that "[m]aybe what comes next is that we stop
treating 'law' as something to celebrate, expand, and worship. May we
learn to lay down the law."'
16
Is there not an enormous problem with this suggestion? Even while
he suggests that we lay down the law and legal scholarship about the
law, Schlag actually does legal scholarship. His opponents are well jus-
tified in accusing Pierre of an inconsistency in this regard. As Henry V
9. It is not just legal academics who should stop doing what they do. He seemingly does not
want us to practice law. Indeed, Schlag's comments about practicing attorneys are almost as
vociferous as his comments about academics. See, e.g., id. at 38-39.
10. Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, I 10 HARV. L. REV. 877, 908, 919 (1997) (noting that
law's "fundamental units of analysis .. .are a locus of non-determination"); Pierre Schlag,
Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929,
960 (1988) ("As members of a service industry devoted to the manipulation of endless webs of
intricately intertwined texts, it may be doubted whether many of us often encounter anything
(professionally) that might actually qualify as a real object.").
11. Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997).
12. SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 166.
13. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 13 (1998).
14. On Bentham, see JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL,
LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE 216 n.270 (1998) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL];
SLAVOJ 712EK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY
85-88 (1993).
15. This is one of Lacan's notorious pronouncements: that the Big Other does not exist. See
Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality, and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 263, 337-38 (2002) [hereinafter Schroeder, Stumbling Block].
16. SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 166.
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put it, "Tis good for men to love their present pains upon example."'7
Yet Schlag has not given the troops a very good example of his pro-
gram; he has remained a productive legal scholar. The very passion, let
alone the sheer volume, of his writing belies Schlag's recommendation
that we should lay down the law. How could he tell us what to do-to
lay down the law-if he himself were to lay down the law? The only
way he can successfully get us to lay down the law is if he himself does
not lay down the law.
Beyond laying down the law, another normative program emerges
from Schlag's work: "What is missing in normative legal thought is any
serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice,
the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have)
to the field of pain and death."' 18 The suggestion is that we should come
to realize that law itself is the very ground for the field of pain and
death. When this is realized, the normative program to lay down the law
becomes a high moral imperative. It appears from Schlag's work that the
proper project for legal scholarship is to expose law's responsibility for
pain and death. This is what we should do. When legal scholarship has
achieved this task, presumably pain and death will have been eliminated.
Turning the tables on law and economics, Pierre implies that it would be
efficient (i.e., useful to human utility) if law would abolish itself.
But, stranded on a field exfoliated of pain and death, what next?
The implicit program seems to be that, once the distortions of law are
removed, the subject simply does not have to be told to do anything.
Whatever the subject does will be authentic. This is the free, liberated
subject that Schlag's normativity implies-a natural subject from whom
completeness and authenticity has been unfairly denied by the legal
bureaucracy. If we are right, then underlying Schlag's polemic against
law is an uncritical romantic psychology. This would in turn mean that
Schlag is not so much a critical scholar as a romantic one.
This implicit psychology means that Schlag has something in com-
mon with the political liberals he attacks. Both Schlag and liberals
believe in the autonomy of the human subject-and the possibility that
the subject can achieve this desired state of freedom. Furthermore, they
both believe in the existence of subjectivity in a state of nature on which
positive law or social engineering cannot possibly improve.
Law, then, has become a tool for oppressing the bureaucratic soci-
ety that legal academia unwittingly serves. Legal subjects, subjected to
the law, are alienated from themselves by the law. The corollary to this
17. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 4, sc. I (emphasis added).
18. SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 36-37.
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is that there must be at least the possibility that subjectivity could be
other than it is now-distorted by law.
Lest we be misunderstood, we emphasize that we agree with much
of the above account. We agree with Schlag's suggestion that normativ-
ity cannot succeed. Virtually every observation that Schlag makes about
law and policy scholarship (normativity) is correct. Where we disagree
is that there is a subject left standing once legal normativity is abolished.
Unfortunately, although Schlag ostensibly bases much of his analysis on
the post-modem critique of the liberal conception of the autonomous
self-identical subject, he, in fact, falls back on a liberal conception of a
natural self.
Romanticism implies that the self-identical individual of liberalism
is real-but disfigured by law and hence on a field of pain and death.
The post-modern position is quite different. It denies the pre-legality of
personality and suggests that personality is itself a legal idea. On this
view, the self-identical subject of liberalism cannot exist as a theoretical
matter.
Lacanian psychoanalysis agrees with half of Schlag's proposition.
The subject is on a field of pain and death, where it is not self-identical,
but severely wounded by law. It is precisely law (broadly understood as
the symbolic order) that castrates the subject, as Schlag maintains.
Breaking the chains of the law, however, would not free but would oblit-
erate the subject. Subjectivity is nothing but the split, the gap, the rift in
the natural subject torn by law. If law is removed, the rift that creates
subjectivity is obliterated.
What was Lacan's name for a person who successfully follows
Schlag's normative program and slips the chains of law? His term for
such a person was "psychotic." 19 For Lacan, the normative program is
precisely not to let go of the symbolic order, for that would be the death
of subjectivity, not its liberation.
What we now show is how very differently psychoanalysis schema-
tizes the same insight Schlag has intuited. The Lacanians agree that law
"does not exist" and nevertheless oppresses the subject. Following Kant
and Hegel, Lacan concludes that law's very failure to meet its own stan-
dards is what enables it to function."0 The legal subject is indeed "cas-
trated" by the law, but this very castration-the failure of the Kantian
subject truly to know the moral law-is the condition of possibility for
the actualization of freedom.
19. See infra note 39.
20. Schroeder, Stumbling Block, supra note 15, at 309-10, 338.
2003]
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II. READING LACAN
Lacan is not an easy read. He often uses familiar Freudian vocabu-
lary but assigns unexpected meanings to them. Sometimes he seems to
be not merely idiosyncratic, but intentionally and infuriatingly confus-
ing. Statements that at first seem to say one thing, on further considera-
tion reveal themselves to say something else completely diverse if not
contradictory. He engages in elaborate punning and wordplay.
Unpleasant and graphic anatomically sexual terms (i.e., phallus and cas-
tration) denote highly abstract, theoretical concepts. To make matters
worse, the complexity of his terminology was exacerbated by his
penchant for schematizing his theories through quasi-mathematical sym-
bols and formulae called "mathemes."' 2 Needless to say, these factors
makes Lacan extremely difficult to understand, and he is subject to mul-
tiple conflicting interpretations and misinterpretations. Whether it is
because of our "pragmatic" American education or our too-too Teutonic
ancestry, we have little patience with Lacan's style.
Interpreting Lacan over time is made more difficult by the fact that
he produced relatively little formal written works setting out his theory.
Most of his work consists of edited transcripts of the annual seminars he
delivered in Paris from 1954 until circa 1980. His lecture style, like his
terminology, is based on indirection, allusion, and elaborate wordplay
rather than formal exposition. Consequently, his books have a looser
structure than one would expect from a composed work. The fact that
Lacan constantly made substantial modifications to his theories over the
years without expressly announcing that he had changed his mind also
complicates matters.
Nevertheless, Lacan's work taken as a whole22 eventually reveals a
well developed speculative system. As painful as Lacan is to read, he is,
as Michelin would say, vaut le voyage.
a. The Three Orders
Lacan posits that the subject is split between three orders which he
called the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real.23
21. A glossary of mathemes can be found in BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN
LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 173-74 (1995).
22. Or at least as much as is available in English. As of the current date, only fourteen out of
twenty-seven seminars have appeared in French editions, of which only six complete seminars
(and various sessions of a few others) have appeared in official English translations. A number of
English translations are in production.
23. See Jacqueline Rose, Introduction 11, in FEMININE SEXUALITY: JACQUES LACAN AND THE
ECOLE FREUDIENNE 27-31 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., Jacqueline Rose trans., 1983)
[hereinafter FEMININE SEXUALITY]; see also JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN
BOOK I: FREUD'S PAPERS ON TECHNIQUE 80 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., John Forrester trans.,
[Vol. 57:767
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The symbolic order is that of language, law, and signification. 24
Lacan often calls this order "the big Other. '25 As it includes law, the
symbolic is the focus of the remaining portion of this article. To under-
stand the symbolic, however, one needs to understand the other two
orders to which it is inextricably linked. Indeed, Lacan explained the
relationship of the three to subjectivity with the metaphor of the overlap-
ping rings of the figure known as the Borromean knot:
26
Imaginary
If any single ring is removed, the entire knot of subjectivity
instantly falls apart.
The imaginary order is that of imagery, complementarily, and
meaning. The imaginary order is the law in its closed fixity. The
world of right answers in law, or any other totalizing vision of reality, is
1988) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR I]; see also generally, ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES LACAN: A
FEMINIST INTRODUCTION 10 (1990). As is the case with virtually all of Lacan's concepts, not only
are three orders extremely complex, Lacan's thinking about them developed over time. For
example, in the early seminars of the 1950s, Lacan concentrated more on the contrast between the
symbolic and the imaginary, whereas his later seminars put more emphasis on the real. Indeed, it
seems that over time, Lacan shifted some of the functions he originally assigned to the imaginary
over to the real.
24. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 653, 659, 667 (2000).
25. See David Caudill, Lacan and Law: Networking with the Big Other, I STUD. IN
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 25 (1992).
26. STUART SCHNEIDERMAN, JACQUES LACAN: THE DEATH OF AN INTELLECTUAL HERO 33
(1983). For a brief description of the metaphor of the Borromean knot see SLAVOJ ZIZEK,
LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE 5, 143
(1991) [hereinafter 2ZIEK, LOOKING AWRY].
27. SLAVOJ 712EK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF
IDEOLOGY 123 (1994) [hereinafter ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE]; Jeanne L. Schroeder,
The Eumenides: The Foundation of Law in the Repression of the Feminine (2000) (unpublished
manuscript) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Eumenides].
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imaginary.28
The real is that which cannot be reduced to, or which seems to
escape, the other two orders.29  The real is our sense that there is an
external reality that cannot be reduced to words or pictures. Conse-
quently, our intuitive understanding that there is an object world outside
of us is located within the real. But so is our understanding of God (in
the sense of the Absolute), death, and everything else that we sense is
beyond the domain of human speech and imagery.3 ° In Kantian terms,
the real is our sense that there is a noumenon, a thing-in-itself, that is
beyond our phenomenological understanding. 3'
Following Hegel,32 the Lacanian "real" should not be thought of as
the noumenon itself but as the illusion of a noumenon.33 Nor can the
"real" be taken as physical reality or the "object world" per se. Lacan
does not doubt that there is an objective material, empirical reality exter-
nal to man's perception and interpretation. Being empirical, however,
this reality falls within Kant's category of phenomena. Consequently,
Lacan's conception of the real does not question the existence of phe-
nomena, but Kant's theory of the noumena-that there exists in addition
to empirical reality, some non-empirical, purely rational thing-in-itself
that exists outside human understanding. This sense that the thing-in-
itself exists outside our understanding is itself only an appearance gener-
ated by our mis-understanding-i.e., the real.34
28. SLAVOJ Z12EK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 43 (1989).
29. In Elisabeth Grosz's words: "The Real is not however the same as reality; reality is lived
as and known through imaginary and symbolic representations." GRosz, supra note 23, at 34.
She continues: "The Real cannot be experienced a such: it is capable of representation or
conceptualization only through the reconstructive or inferential work of the imaginary and
symbolic orders. Lacan himself refers to the Real as "'the lack of a "lack .... Id.
30. "The gods belong to the field of the real." See, e.g., JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHo-ANALYSIs 45 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Alan Sheridan
trans., 1981) (1977) [hereinafter LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTALS].
The gods and the dead are real because the only encounter we have with the real is
based on the canceling of our perceptual conscious, or our sense of being alive: the
real is real whether we experience it or not and regardless of how we experience it.
The real is most real when we are not there; and when we are there, the real does not
adapt itself or accommodate itself to our being there. The concept of the real
implies the annihilation of the subject.
SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 26, at 76. As discussed in Lacan's seminar of feminine sexuality, the
mystic's experience of God is feminine jouissance. Of course, this means that any attempt to give
affirmative content to the idea of God (as in religions) is imaginary, not in the sense that such a
God does not exist, but that our understanding of such a God is located in the imaginary order.
31. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 164, 280 (J.M.D. Merklejohn trans., 1990).
32. ROBERT B. PIPPIN, HEGEL'S IDEALISM: THE SATISFACTIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 206
(1989) ("The major point ... is to argue that there is literally nothing 'beyond' or 'behind' or
responsible for the human experience of the world of appearances.").
33. Schroeder, Stumbling Block, supra note 15, at 329.
34. Actual markets, like law, are located in the order of the symbolic. In contrast, the
[Vol. 57:767
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Although Lacan does not question the existence of an objective
empirical world, he does question our ability to have a direct under-
standing of it. All three Lacanian orders are human reinterpretations of
experience. The real is therefore not that which is "out there" but that
which we think is "out there." The real includes the dream of a whole-
ness, a completion, a permanence, and an integrity. The promise of such
completion (we think) is "out there," beyond the symbolic order. The
real includes the dream of a subject who is not split (castrated).
This dream of the real is not always utopian. It can be a horrifying
nightmare. The real is the world of no distinctions, no consciousness,
and no subjectivity. It is a mythical primal unity with the universe that
must have existed before we are born, and to which we might return
when we die. The real is where all movement stops.
We seek relief from the ever-changing, partial world of the sym-
bolic, and the primal, dead fullness of the real in the third order of the
imaginary. The imaginary is not merely the realm of images, but of
meaning." Meaning, in contrast to the contingent context bound con-
cept of signification, is perfect correspondence, commensuration, or
self-identity between sign and object. It is not "X stands for Y," but "X
is Y." The liberal legalist conception of law is imaginary. Lacan associ-
ates the imaginary to animalistic thinking.36 The imaginary is the order
of mirror images, and simple negations where everything always is or is
not. The imaginary is the fantasy that we can somehow preserve the
reassuringly static aspect of the real, without submitting to its terrify-
ingly deadly aspect. The imaginary is the fantasy that we can somehow
achieve the freedom of the symbolic, without risking its unpredictability
and ceaseless change.
Using the imaginary, we build fantasy structures which seem to
bind the symbolic order together so it precludes the (horrific) real and
economic ideal of the perfect market is "real" (or noumenal) in the technical sense. The perfect
market is the realm beyond distinctions of time and space, where each subject has perfect
information about himself and all other subjects, including perfect knowledge of his own
preferences and desires, where all objects immediately flow to the highest valuing user so that all
subjects eventually become perfectly indifferent between what they have and any other
combination of goods at the perfect price ratios. In the perfect market all actual market
transaction stops. Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and
Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 500 (1998) [hereinafter, Schroeder, End of the Market].
35. LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 30, at 212 (1977).
36. Lacan gives the example of a male fish who attacks anything that displays the coloring
that distinguishes the male of his species. This is not because he is capable of deciding that he
should fight rival males for mates or determining that, since males of his species are a certain
color, as a rule of thumb he should start attacking whenever he sees this color. Rather, in the
piscine mind, this color is just that which must be attacked. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF
JACQUES LACAN BOOK IIl: THE PSYCHOSES 1955-1956 93-95 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Russell
Grigg trans., 1993) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR III].
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becomes the (utopian) real. It is these fantasies, these fictions, that
enable us to get through the day and through our lives. Note, however,
because the fantasies only contingently bind together three very different
aspects of the psyche-the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real-there
is going to be an inevitable split between what we imagine we desire
(the "little other" that we think will make us whole) and our ultimate
meta-desire (wholeness and completion).
b. Castration
The Lacanian subject is not merely "split," but castrated. This term
does not refer to medical procedure. It refers to the permanent wound
that the split subject feels because part of his self is beyond his self-in
the symbolic realm of law.37
Lacan agrees with Kant that the human subject is the "faculty of
desire. 38 What does it mean for the subject to desire? First, and most
simply, the fact that the normal adult subject desires (or in economic
terms, has preferences and utilities he seeks to maximize) means that at
some level he feels unsatisfied, partial, and lacking. The subject com-
pares his feeling of "lack" with an imagined state of what it would be to
be full. In other words, he fantasizes about what it would take to satisfy
his desire, what it would be like to be whole, to lack his lack.
Lacan uses masculine anatomic metaphors to describe this process
because the "masculine" position is the imaginary vision of being whole.
Of course, women desire as much as men and, when they do, it is evi-
dence that they embrace the masculine position. The desiring subject
who takes this position is "castrated."39 Lacan calls that which is
37. SLAVOJ ZEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER: AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND RELATED
MATrERS 46-47 (1996).
38. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 32 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans.
1996) (1873) [hereinafter CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON].
39. In this essay, we limit ourselves to brief discussions of the normal "neurotic" subject, who
can be either an obsessional or an hysteric. Not all subjects are adequately castrated, however.
Some are perverts or psychotics. Psychotics are the only ones who truly see through the
artificiality of the symbolic order because they are unable to maintain the separation of the three
orders. As 2iek says, "psychosis [is] the maintenance of an external distance from the symbolic
order .. " SLAVOJ ZIZEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL
FACTOR 101 (1991) [hereinafter ZIZEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO]. Elsewhere he
says that "this level of 'forced choice' [i.e. the submission to the symbolic order] is precisely what
the psychotic position lacks the psychotic subject acts as if he has a truly free choice 'all the way
along."' SLAVOJ 71EK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY
19 (1999) [hereinafter, 217EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT]; see also 7iEK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 26,
at 20; SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 14, at 88-89. Consequently, on the one hand, the
psychotic raves because the symbolic order of language loses signification. On the other hand,
"real" inanimate objects begin to talk to him.
The pervert is someone who, because he cannot achieve subjectivity, seeks to be the object of
the Big Other's desire. As Jacques-Alain Miller explains:
[Vol. 57:767
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deemed to have been lost in castration the "phallus.""0  The phallus is
Lacan's term for the lack of a lack." 1 It is the symbol of whatever it
would be that would take away the subject's feeling of incomplete-
ness-it is lost wholeness itself.
42
A second point about castration is that the desiring subject
imagines that he must have been whole in the past. Wholeness is exper-
ienced as a lost state. One express example of this is the fantasy of once
having perfect unity with the mother in the womb. Another might be the
myths common in many religions that mankind has fallen from a prime-
val state of grace. This is, of course, an imaginary autobiography."3
It is commonly thought that the pervert uses other people, other peoples' bodies,
without due respect for their status as subjects. Lacan's fundamental clinical thesis
regarding perversion is the opposite. Lacan asserts that the pervert devotes himself
to the Other's jouissance, the Other's sexual enjoyment, trying to restore lost sexual
enjoyment to the Other.
Jacques-Alain Miller, A Discussion of Lacan's "Kant with Sade, " in READING SEMINARS I AND II:
LACAN'S RETURN TO FREUD 212, 213 (Richard Feldstein et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Miller, A
Discussion of Lacan's Kant with Sade]. A masochist is a pervert who does not feel completely
castrated and, therefore, tries to get his lover to complete the process. RENATA SALECL,
(PER)VERSIONS OF LovE AND HATE 156 (1998).
40. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 14, at 87-89.
41. Lacan specifically used the phrase "lack of a lack" to describe the order of the real.
GRoSz, supra note 23, at 34. Insofar as the phallus is that which is lost in the orders of the
symbolic and the imaginary, it is located in the real.
42. Insofar as Lacan argues that all subjects are either masculine or feminine and that
sexuality is the position a subject takes with respect to castration, the negative unspoken pregnant
of Lacan's use of a masculine metaphor to describe the experience of castration is the necessity of
a feminine metaphor to capture a different experience. The masculine subject feels that he is not
whole because he has lost his most precious part (i.e., his phallus). But, this interpretation seems
to hold out the hope that either castration is not inevitable or that it is a temporary condition that
the subject can cure by obtaining either the initial lost object or some substitute object (such as a
perfect mate). SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 14, at 232-36, 243-45, 303-04, 328-34.
As we shall see, the masculine position is an attempt to deny castration. In contrast, the
feminine feels that she is not whole, not because she has lost a part, but somehow her very self has
been changed; she is not so much dismembered as shattered. Like Humpty-Dumpty, the feminine
position is that no one will ever be able to put her together again. The woman does not identify
the phallus as separable object that has been lost. Rather she identifies with the phallus; it is not
that something is lost, she is lost. As such, castration is seen as a permanent and irreparable loss
of innocence and integrity. Accordingly, when speaking of the feminine position we could use
metaphors of violent defloration, rape, pollution, and corruption.
43. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 815,
899-903 (1999) [hereinafter Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora]. This is true in the technical
psychoanalytic, not religious, sense. Freud seems to have thought that religion was a sham. In
contrast, Lacan can be read consistently with religious belief. We read Lacan as being deeply
influenced by Saint Augustine and his entire theory as revolving about the Christian problem of
the unrequited longing of the soul for God. After all, Lacan owes heavy debts to Kant and Hegel,
whose theories are deeply Christian. When Lacan uses the terms "symbolic, imaginary, and real"
he is speaking about our perception or our interpretation of ourselves and the object world, not the
ontological state of the object world to which we do not have direct contact. Our perception of the
abstract concept of God as the Absolute beyond all limits is "real" and our vision of specific
aspects of a personal God is probably "imaginary." This no more suggests that God in either
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Third, the subject deduces from his current sense of lack and from
his fantasy that he was once whole, the false conclusion that the reason
why he is not whole now is that someone has done something to him.
The subject did not merely lose his wholeness; wholeness was taken
from him. This is the concept of stolen enjoyment.44 More precisely,
the idea that someone has stolen enjoyment is a paranoid construction.
Paranoia is the fantasy that someone is in charge of the big Other and
bears the blame for imposing the wound of castration.45
Lacan's account of castration describes Schlag's romantic attack on
the law. Schlag notes that the legal subject is alienated and oppressed
within the legal system and concludes from this that it is the law that is
responsible for the subject's condition. Lacan would agree with this part
of Schlag's analysis. In our judgment, however, Schlag jumps from the
observation that the law castrates the legal subject to the false corollary
that the subject would be uncastrated but for the law, or but for the de-
centered bureaucracy that perpetuates law. Lacan, in contrast, posits
that not only are there no uncastrated subjects in fact, but there could be
no uncastrated subject in theory. Castration is the process that creates
the subject, and the subject is nothing but his own castration.
The Lacanian false autobiography (reflected in Schlag's paranoid
romanticism) is a "just-so" story we tell ourselves of how we came to be
the way we are. The story of castration is curiously satisfying not only
because it seems to give a reason for our present condition, but because
it seems to add agency or subjectivity to an otherwise un-enchanted
world. This, of course, is the great appeal of conspiracy theory. To be
able to change "I just happen to be lacking," to "I feel lack because
someone did something to me," suggests that: (1) even though I am not
in control, at least someone is in control; and (2) because my condition is
the result of the acts of this controlling person, perhaps this condition
can be remedied and prevented in the future if only I could wrest control
away from him. That is, the feeling of inadequacy is transformed into a
sense of injustice. If nothing else, the Lacanian just-so story gives us a
figure against which we can channel our frustration and/or admiration.
That is, the idea of castration presumes a powerful "someone" out there
who does the castrating. Who is this someone? As we shall discuss in a
subsequent section, one of the names of this imaginary castrator is the
sense is necessarily a mere figment of our imagination than it suggests that the planet earth does
not exist because our understanding of the earth is always filtered through the real, the imaginary,
and the symbolic.
44. RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER THE
FALL OF SOCIALISM 28 (1994).
45. SLAVOJ 2I2EK, THE AnYss OF FREEDOM 9 (1997).
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Other-the symbolic order of law and language itself. We are castrated
by law.
c. The Initiation Rite of Subjectivity
Another way of capturing the complex concept of castration is to
state that the subject feels split because that which is most himself is
also outside of himself.
Following Hegel, Lacan posited that subjectivity is intersubjectiv-
ity.46 We become conscious thinking beings (and, accordingly, uncon-
scious desiring beings) through inter-personal relations-by being
recognized by other persons.47 Specifically, recognition in the eyes of
others requires submission to the law, which also implies the acquisition
of language and the adoption of a sexual identity. Even though there are
anatomical differences between the two biological sexes, "appropriate"
sex-identifying behavior, courting and mating rituals, have cultural com-
ponents that must be learned-indeed, much of popular culture and all
of popular music is devoted to precisely this process. Our identity-
sexual and otherwise-is not under our control. Consequently, we feel
that our most intimate selves are, in fact, external to us. Lacan expresses
this with the neologism that our subjectivity is "extimate."48
46. Hegel memorably referred to the "I that is we and the we that is I":
What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is-this
absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-
consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and
independence: "I" that is "We" and "We" that is "I." tt is in self-consciousness, in
the Notion of Spirit that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves
behind it the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of
the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present.
GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 110-11 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) [hereinafter
HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY].
47. We analyze the role of recognition in the Bildungsroman of subjectivity in Jeanne L.
Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Wrong and the Essence of Right, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2002), and David Gray Carlson, How to Do Things with Hegel,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (2000).
48. "Ex-timate" is a Lacanian neologism, representing that which is foreign but within us.
ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 39, at 45. The "ex-timate" is what we are "more than
ourselves." Id. at 375. It reflects the proposition that what we feel is most ourselves-our
subjectivity, our sexuality, our desire, our moral conscience, etc.-are all created through
intersubjective relationships, language, and law (i.e. the symbolic order) and is, therefore, in some
way outside of ourselves as well. Schroeder, End of the Market, supra note 34, at 502-03; see
also generally Jacques-Alain Miller, Extimite (Elizabeth Doisneau ed., Francoise Massardier-
Kenney trans.), in LACANIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, STRUCTURE, AND SOCIETY 74
(March Bracher et al. trans., 1994) [hereinafter THEORY OF DISCOURSE].
20031
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
d. The Other Does Not Exist
According to psychoanalysis, subjectivity is created by accultura-
tion-by submitting to the big Other. The big Other is the entire sym-
bolic order of intersubjective relationships including, most importantly,
language, law, sexuality, and the market.49 The subject subjected to the
big Other is split or castrated. This does not mean, however, that once
the subject was whole or that it could be whole again. Rather, subjectiv-
ity is precisely the gap, the split, the negativity, and unquenchable desire
for recognition resulting from this submission." Without this split there
is no subjectivity. Indeed, from a Lacanian perspective psychosis is pre-
cisely the inability to maintain this constituent split. Hence, Schlag is
correct in concluding that law is a violent, alienating institution, but far
from correct in implying that it could be otherwise, that the subject
could ever "lay down the law," or that some bureaucratic agency is the
only thing that keeps the symbolic order from flying apart.
It is initially surprising, therefore, to learn that another one of
Lacan's most notorious dicta is that the Other does not exist. Although
this might sound inconsistent with the proposition that the Other splits
the subject, it is, in fact, a corollary to Lacan's notion of the split subject.
The Lacanian subject and the law are mutually constituting-if one is
split, then so is the other. "This is the big secret of psychoanalysis."'"
One of Lacan's earliest mathemes is that of the split subject. This
is a capital letter "S" bifurcated by a line or bar representing its essential
split "S" (pronounced "the barred S").5 2 Lacan originally represented
the symbolic order as big Other by a capital "A" (for the French Autre).
In his later seminars, however, Lacan added to this "A" the same bar
that bifurcates the "S" of subjectivity. "A" (pronounced the "barred
A") 53 graphically represents that the fundamental gap of castration that
creates the barred subject also exists in the symbolic order that castrates
the barred subject. 54
As we have seen, part of Schlag's attack on normativity consists of
the accusation that law does not exist. 5 In this section, we argue that
from a Lacanian viewpoint, Schlag is correct. Law does not exist in the
sense that material objects exist. Unfortunately, Schlag fails to grasp the
implications of his point. Obviously, part of the debate springs from
49. See Schroeder, End of the Market, supra note 34, at 504.
50. FINK, supra note 21, at 45 ("The subject is nothing but this very split.").
51. YANNIS STAURAKAKIS, LACAN AND THE POLITICAL 39 (1999).
52. FINK, supra note 21, at 173.
53. Id.
54. On the barred A, see id.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
(Vol. 57:767
LAW'S NON-EXISTENT EMPIRE
terminology. To understand what Lacan means when he says the law
does not exist, we must resort to linguistic theory.
I. LINGUISTICS
Lacan says that the symbolic order does not exist, and later, even
more notoriously, he says that Woman does not exist.56 Such statements
appeal to the common sense view of "existence" that equates it with
sensuality or sense certainty-what Hegel called "the most abstract and
poorest truth. All that it says about what it knows is just that it is . . .57
Typically, both liberals and critics of liberal legalism implicitly accept
this impoverished definition. This is existence as something "objective"
in the sense of entirely external to the subject, pre-existing and
permanenti 8
Schlag shares the usage described above (though Lacan's usage is
designed to be ironic). In Schlag's unironic view, for law to exist it
must have a "robust referent. ' 59 Although Schlag does not offer a defi-
nition, in context he seems to mean that law must refer to something
permanent and pre-existing. This is, of course, similar to Kant's idea of
the unchanging noumenon, or thing-in-itself-the thing that is beyond
thought or appearance, time or space.
The symbolic order is not objective in the sense that it refers to
some external and permanent "object"-some "robust referent" or nou-
menon. Indeed, from a Hegelian-Lacanian standpoint, no object is
"robust." The symbolic order is only objective in the more modest sense
that it is not entirely subjective or unique and idiosyncratic to any one
individual subject. Rather, the symbolic order is intersubjective.6 ° Law,
like language, is by definition a human creation. More precisely, it is a
collective creation created by a society as a whole and applied generally
to a class of subjects. No one person commands it.
56. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 14, at 326-29.
In other words, man literally ex-sists: his entire being lies "out there," in woman.
Woman on the other hand, does not exist, she insists, which is why she does not
come to be only through man. Something in her escapes the relation to Man, the
reference to the phallic enjoyment; and, as is well known, Lacan endeavored to
capture this excess by the notion of a "non-all" feminine jouissance.
Z1EK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 27, at 188 (footnote omitted).
57. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 46, 1 91, at 58.
58. For a description of Hegel's theory of existence, see David Gray Carlson, Duellism in
Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1999).
59. Schlag, Law and Phrenology, supra note 10, at 919.
60. This is one of the many possible definitions of objectivity. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Subject:
Object, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 50-52 (1992) (cataloguing the many types of objectivity).
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The symbolic order of law, language, and sexuality is extimate.6' It
is that which is most ourselves (i.e., intimate), in that our subjectivity is
created through law. Yet law is experienced as being external to our-
selves. Subjectivity is nothing but extimacy-our alienation or castra-
tion from the law that creates us. This is why Lacan calls the symbolic
order the Other. Although it is internalized (i.e., extimate) we misunder-
stand it as something external that is imposed upon us.
Surprisingly, because Lacan worked under a regime of civil law
and betrayed no discernable familiarity with Anglo-American legal tra-
ditions, his conception of the symbolic order is much more in keeping
with common law conceptions. The symbolic order is in a state of con-
stant creation and, therefore, of constant destruction and change. Law,
like language, can never refer directly to external reality, but can ulti-
mately refer directly only to other law. Simple one-to-one identifica-
tions are imaginary (picture thinking), not symbolic (linguistic). For
Lacan, "meaning," as opposed to signification, is strictly imaginary.62
II. THE BAR
Lacan's conception of the symbolic owes much to Ferdinand de
Saussure's linguistic theory. Like Saussure, Lacan diagrammed signifi-
cation as a relationship between a signifier and a signified: S/s, or "a
signifier stands for a signified. '63 The signifier (S) is placed above the
signified (s) to indicate its pre-eminence.
This by no means represents a direct, unmediated relation between
signifier and signified.64 Such a naive view is as remote as possible
from Lacan's view. One of the primary insights of psychoanalysis (and,
indeed, of most traditional Western philosophy and theology since at
least Plato) is that we, as conscious, speaking beings do not have direct
access to the object world. True we do have immediate sense impres-
sions of the object world, but the moment we become aware that we are
sensing something we are already interpreting, and thereby altering, the
experience through the symbolic and the imaginary orders.65 Kant drew
from the intermediation of a "transcendental unity of apperception"6 6 the
61. ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 39, at 45.
62. LACAN, SEMINAR II1, supra note 36, at 54.
63. JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS: A SELECTION 149 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) [hereinafter
LACAN, ECRITS].
64. Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses of Law: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal Practice
and Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15, 26-28 (2000) [hereinafter Schroeder, Four Discourses].
65. For an excellent essay explaining this point from the perspective of Hegel's theory of
reflection, see Michael Kosok, The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectic Logic, in HEGEL: A
COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 237 (Alistair Maclntyre ed., 1972).
66. KANT, supra note 31, at 122.
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lesson that there is an unchanging noumenal world "out there" that we
could rationally deduce, but not know directly.
Lacan transformed this intuition-that there is an external object
world irreducible to language-into the third psychic order of the "real."
This "real" is itself a part of subjectivity and is neither empirical "real-
ity" nor Kant's non-empirical thing-in-itself. Consistent with his rejec-
tion of noumena, Lacan also rejects the concept that the signified to
which a signifier refers is some reality external to language. Instead, the
signified to which a signifier refers is revealed to be itself yet another
signifier, that in turn refers to another signifier, ad infinitum in an unend-
ing chain of signification.67 It is signification all the way down. This
means that no word (signifier) directly refers to any "natural" object or
concept, but can only be understood in the context of the rest of the
language. That is, every signifier refers not directly to the desired signi-
fied, but to another signified in an unending chain of signification.
The line or "bar" that separates the signifier (S) from the signified
(s) in the matheme of signification designates the fact that there is no
direct immediate relationship between the two. One is split or barred
from the other.68 This is the same concept of radical separation that is
indicated by the "bar" we have already seen that bifurcates the
mathemes of subjectivity and the Other who does not exist. Because
signification takes place only in an unending chain of signifiers, the rela-
tionship between any one signifier and one signified is temporary and
contingent. Signification is in a state of constant slippage as signifiers
replace each other above the bar, signifieds replace each other beneath
the bar, and signifiers and signifieds exchange places with respect to the
bar (so that the signified becomes a signifier).
69
67. Lacan compared this "chain of signifiers ... as ... 'rings of a necklace that is a ring in
another necklace made of rings."' William J. Richardson, Lacan and the Subject of
Psychoanalysis, Interpreting Lacan, 6 PSYCHIATRY & HUMAN. 54 (Joseph Smith & William
Kerrigan eds., 1983) (quoting LACAN, ECRITS, supra note 63). As Richardson explains: "The
meaning of this chain does not 'consist' in any one of these elements but rather 'insists' in the
whole, where the 'whole' may be taken to be the entire interlude as described, whose meaning, or
rather whose 'effect' of meaning, is discerned retroactively .... " Id. at 55.
68. Saussure also meant for the bar to indicate the
arbitrary nature of the relation between the [signifier and signified]. But Lacan
stresses the importance of this "bar," conceiving it as indeed a "barrier" to any one-
to-one relationship between signifier and signified, insisting that any given signifier
refers not to any corresponding signified but rather to another signifier.
Id. at 54.
69. LACAN, ECRITS, supra note 63, at 154.
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Ill. METAPHOR AND METONYMY
The two tropes of signification are metaphor and metonymy. Meta-
phor is the fantasy of crossing the bar that separates the signifier and
signified. 70 It stands for the immediate relation between the two. Meta-
phors emphasize identity over difference. Metaphor asserts A = B, but it
suppresses A B. Metaphors are therefore not entirely false, but they
are not entirely true.7'
Metonymy, in contrast, honors the bar that forever separates the
two registers of signification.72 If metaphor is the attempt to cross this
bar, metonymy is the sliding of meaning above and below the bar. Rec-
ognizing that the signifier cannot capture the whole truth of the signi-
fied, the speaker instead attempts to refer to the signified by
indirection-by referring to what it is not. Once again, the truth of
metonymy is partial, but for a different reason than metaphoric truth is
partial. Metaphor (this is like that) always combines a true and a false
statement about the signified. In contrast, everything a metonymy says
about the signified is true but incomplete.
70. That is, "[t]he formula for metaphor contains an addition sign: +. Lacan writes of this
'the + sign ... here manifesting the crossing of the bar'. . . . The 'bar' is always represented in
Lacan's notations as a horizontal line; it is therefore 'crossed' by the vertical line in the + sign."
JANE GALLOP, READING LACAN 119 (1985) (citations omitted).
Metaphor is the temporary identification of a specific signifier above the line with a specific
signified below-it is the assertion that although the signifier and the signified are different, we
can identify a similarity between the two which allows us to identify one to the other for a specific
purpose. That is, metaphor emphasizes the similarity or trait shared between two different
concepts and de-emphasizes the differences. Metaphor is Lacan's term for the Freudian concept
of "condensation." Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 64, at 28 n.47.
71. According to Hegel, "U]udgment [i.e., metaphor] is an identical relation between subject
and predicate." GEORG W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 90 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969).
For example, the rose is red. Judgments, however, fail to capture the whole truth:
[T]he subject has a number of determinatenesses other than that of the predicate,
and also that the predicate is more extensive than the subject. Now if the content is
speculative, the non-identical aspect of subject and predicate is also an essential
moment, but in the judgement this is not expressed.
Id. at 90-91. In other words, the rose is many things other than red, yet this "speculative content"
is suppressed. In addition, many things are red besides roses. This too is suppressed.
To fill out the inadequacy of the judgment, the opposite judgment should be added: the rose
is not (just) red. The moment of identity (sameness) is legitimate but incomplete. The moment of
difference (unsameness) is likewise legitimate but not complete.
72. Metonymy is the "feminine" trope of signification. LACAN, CRITS, supra note 63, at 157.
Metonymy emphasizes the difference between the signifier and the signified over the similarity; it
insists that the signifier can never capture the totality of the concept of the signified in totality.
Metonymy is the insistence that the bar of signification cannot be crossed. Consequently, in
metonymy the signifier does not attempt to describe the essential nature of the signified, it only
suggests it. Metonymy is Lacan's rewriting of the Freudian concept of "displacement."
Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 64, at 28 n.47. The classic case of metonymy used by
Lacan is synecdoche-the designation of the one concept by reference to only one aspect, or the
whole for the part. LACAN, CRITS, supra note 63, at 156.
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Consequently, neither metaphor or metonymy can take the witness
stand without perjuring itself. Metaphor can "swear to tell the truth,"
but it lies if it implies that it tells "nothing but the truth." In contrast,
metonymy can "swear to tell the truth... and nothing but the truth" but
is quite incapable of telling "the whole truth." Both metaphor and
metonymy are unable to conform to the federal securities laws which
makes it unlawful "to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made...
not misleading."73 Metaphor always makes material misstatements and
metonymy always makes material omissions."4 Normative legal schol-
arship is, basically, metaphor, while both Lacanian psychoanalysis and
speculative theory are metonymy.
IV. LAW DOES NOT EXIST - IT INSISTS
Schlag has intuited the Lacanian perspective when he asserts the
fictitious nature of law. Law has no robust referent but always refers
only to other law. He is also absolutely correct to chastise liberal legal
scholars insofar as they expressly assert otherwise, or if they implicitly
do so through their normative policy recommendations. In Lacanian
terms, policy science is suspect not because it adopts the masculine posi-
tion of metaphor that claims to have the truth. This is an inevitable part
of all language. Rather, policy science is suspect because it adopts the
masculine position without self-consciousness and self-understanding.75
Schlag, then, goes beyond what Lacanianism licenses. He condemns law
for not existing, which is fine. But his (normative) calls for justice seem
to reflect an assumption or intuition that law could be made to exist. He
wants the slippage of the symbolic order to stop. He wants the metaphor
of law to be completely true and not partially false. Law, Schlag
implies, should tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
The master signifiers of the law should be real or "noumenal." Both law
and the legal subject should be uncastrated-unbarred.
Lacan's point is not simply that law-indeed, the entire symbolic
order-does not exist, but that it cannot exist in sensual form. To con-
demn the law for its failure to exist is like condemning grass for failing
73. This is, of course, the disclosure standard that reappears throughout the federal securities
laws, including Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
74. Metaphor is masculine from a psychoanalytic perspective in that it is a form of denial of
castration. That is, in metaphor we temporarily claim to have direct access to meaning, to be
whole. Metonymy is feminine in the sense that it is an acceptance of castration. It is the
realization that signification is always partially a failure. See Schroeder, The Eumenides, supra
note 27.
75. Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 64, at 79-82; Schroeder, Stumbling Block, supra
note 15, at 363.
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to be red. Or, to use a closer metaphor, it is like condemning a house, a
painting, a novel, or any other human creation for not being natural.
Even Kant understood that for law to exist as a thing-in-itself (to be
noumenal), it cannot have content. Content added to the empty noume-
non renders it imperfect 76 and therefore, in Lacanian and Schlagian
terms, non-existent-merely phenomenal.
In other words, law functions only to the extent it is castrated-
deprived of its robust referent. It functions just because it does not exist.
Law is artificial-a work of art made by people. For the symbolic lan-
guage to continue to function as an artifact it must constantly be made
by people. There is no one "out there" who invents the English lan-
guage, who imposes culture on the rest of us, and who establishes the
legal system.77 To at least some extent each and every one of us is
constantly in the process of adding to society's creation of the symbolic
order. By obeying the law-and even by disobeying it-we write the
law.
Each one of us is engaged in a continuing project to create and
recreate the symbolic order precisely because no one is completely inte-
grated within the symbolic order. We are either castrated or mad. That
is the choice. This is another meaning of the observation that the law is
not intimate but extimate-what is most ourselves is also most external
and alien to us. We constantly ask the law the hysteric's questions:
"What do you want (from me)? Why don't I fit in? How can I fit in?
Why won't you fit me in? Why won't you fit me? Which is the misfit,
me or the law?" It is precisely these questions-this constantly ques-
tioning of the law's existence and our relationship to the law-that is
simultaneously the creation of law and the creation of our subjectivity.
Our relation to law can be compared to the fairy tale of the
emperor's new clothes.78 In this tale, a pair of con men convinced the
emperor that they would make him a suit out of magic fabric that could
not be seen by fools or persons unworthy of their position. When the
non-existent suit was delivered, the emperor was too mortified to admit
that he could not see it when his similarly embarrassed courtiers insisted
that they could. The emperor transferred funds to the fraudsters, who
76. It then becomes a "hypothetical imperative." CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra
note 38, at 32.
77. The contrary assertion-that there is an "other of the Other" who is in control-is
"paranoia." See Carlson, How to Do Things with Hegel, supra note 47, at 1946; see also 7.IZEK,
LOOKING AWRY, supra note 26, at 8.
78. Schroeder, The Eumenides, supra note 27. See also Hans Christian Andersen, The
Emperor's New Suit, in THE COMPLETE ANDERSEN'S FAIRY TALES 438 (Lily Owens ed., 1981);
Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Subject is Nothing, 5 LAW & CRITIQUE 93, 100-
01 (1994). 2ilek introduces this fairy tale as a metaphor for the Lacanian understanding of
subjectivity in ZIEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra note 39, at 11-12.
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promptly relocated. The emperor thought that his new suit of clothes
offered a perfect opportunity for him to test the competence of his sub-
jects. He had the properties of the magic fabric announced to the popu-
lace and then declared that he would lead a parade in order to display his
new clothes. Although everyone saw a naked emperor, no one remarked
on this fact. Instead they loudly praised the splendor of the imperial
raiment. This is because each person assumed that he was the only one
who could not see the clothes and to admit this fact would prove him a
fool or unworthy. What is not to be missed is that the crowd praises the
emperor's new clothes not despite, but just because, they do not exist.
In Lacanian terms, the emperor's new clothes served the crowd as a
master signifier. This charade came to an end only when an innocent
child-i.e., a pre-oedipal infant who had not yet been inculcated within
the symbolic order-pointed to the fact that the emperor was naked.79
Law's empire is sustained by a vast conspiracy of silence. None of
us believes in it, but we do believe that everyone else believes in it, so
we act as if it exists. To give an example from our own experience,
many of New York City's day spas are manned by Russian immigrants.
Many of these women had relatively prestigious jobs in their homeland
but are unable to find work in their former professions because of defi-
ciencies in language, licensing requirements, or whatever. Conse-
quently, rather than designing bridges they are giving manicures. They
often tell a variation on the following story:
Despite terrible hardships, deprivations, and injustices, most people
were very happy in the former Soviet Union (at least until the very
end) because everyone believed they were engaged in a glorious col-
lective project to build a future perfect society. I alone (or I and my
family) could see that it was all a cruel lie and had to leave. Things
are hard in the United States, and I don't completely fit in, but my
children will be true Americans.
We took these stories at face value until we attended a faculty
workshop given by Renata Salecl, a Lacanian philosopher from Slovenia
who has written extensively on the fall of Communism in Eastern
Europe. She stated that in the former Yugoslavia most people assumed
that everyone else believed in the Communist cause and they were the
only one who could see it was a house of cards. Very few people dared
to say this out loud, however, precisely because they thought that they
were one of the very few who thought so. Communism was a master
signifier that seemed to unify and give meaning to absurdity despite-or
more accurately, just because-of its vapidity. The symbolic order of
79. Zilek insists that the innocent child is the villain of the piece. The crowd needs to believe
in the symbolic order. ZEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do, supra note 39, at 11.
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communism fell quickly when a critical mass of people were willing to
say out loud that the emperor had no clothes.
It is not the case that there is no symbolic order in Russia or Slove-
nia. The story illustrates that if we all stop believing in some specific
regime, the regime must fall; but it does not follow that we can do with-
out the symbolic order. That way madness lies.
V. THE TRUTH OF CASTRATION'S LIE
Castration is the initiation rite of subjectivity.8" We have already
emphasized the Lacanian point that sexuality is symbolic, not natural
(i.e., it is the way we interpret our actuality). The two sexual positions
have different ways of confronting castration.
The masculine is the sexuated position that fears and therefore tries
to deny castration and insist on perfection.8 The feminine, in contrast,
accepts the inevitability of castration.82 The feminine position can lead
to two results. The first is impotent, passive, feminine depression. The
second is an introspection that enables the subject directly to confront
the actuality of castration.83 This leads to yet another Lacanian paradox.
By examining castration closely, the feminine position learns the truth of
castration: It is a lie-castration never happened! This is the truth that
the romantic (the masculine) is unable to accept.
How can the Lacanian feminine insist that castration is a lie when
Lacan insists on its universality? Because, although castration insists
(functions), it does not exist. The feminine position does not deny the
split nature of subjectivity and the symbolic order. Nor does she deny
that the split subject was created through submission to the symbolic
order. Rather, she understands that the masculine metaphor for this pro-
cess is a fundamental mistake.
The metaphor of castration implies that wholeness is a lost state
that has been taken away by the Big Other. In truth, however, subjectiv-
ity has not been split by some external, pre-existing Big Other; subjec-
tivity is this constituent split. As Kant understood, it is the very
imperfection of the present that makes freedom and change possible. By
simply rejecting the impossible romantic masculine goal of perfection
(curing castration), the feminine is able to formulate alternative goals-
80. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 14, at 80.
81. Schroeder, End of the Market, supra note 34, at 307-08; Schroeder, Four Discourses,
supra note 64, at 78-79.
82. Schroeder, End of the Market, supra note 34, at 509.




goals that do not presuppose completeness, wholeness, personal glory,
and masculine dominance.
Understanding the truth of castration's lie allows feminine depres-
sion to evolve into a hope for peace. This is the truth of the Greek myth
of Pandora.84 According to the story, originally all humans were males
living in a golden age. Pandora, the first woman, inadvertently brought
sorrow and illness into the world when she opened a chest given to her
by the malevolent gods at her wedding. Nevertheless, the myth also tells
us that Pandora is responsible for mankind's greatest treasure. While
she released the ills of the world to plague the world, her quick thinking
enabled her to trap hope inside her box.
Masculine mythography blames the feminine for our current cas-
trated state.85 The feminine understanding of this myth, in contrast, is
that there never was a golden age of masculine subjectivity that existed
prior to sexual difference. Mankind only exists insofar as we are cas-
trated and sexualized; it is only the feminine who is able to understand
that this is not a curse, but a promise.
Hope was never among the gifts which the gods placed in her
[box]. Rather, hope was Pandora's gift to herself-bought and paid
for with her tears. It was only her release of the ills which made hope
necessary that caused her retroactively to imagine that she had cap-
tured the hope that she now needed. It is the hope that hope exists
that calls hope into being. Hope, like love, is alchemy-it makes
something out of nothing .... By creating hope, she recreated herself
into an active subject.
This is why the myth insists that Pandora is the mother of us all.
Feminine negativity is the center of both Hegelian philosophy and
Lacanian psychoanalysis. Negativity is the womb of subjectivity. It
is the empty, and therefore potentially fertile, space in the determinis-
tic universe that makes freedom possible and enables us to give birth
to ourselves. The Bible reminds us, however, that "in sorrow [the
Woman] shalt bring forth. t86 1 Without tears the eye is blind. Hope
is created by suffering, desire by castration, love by loneliness, sub-
jectivity by objectivity, law by injustice, the ideal of perfection by the
fact of imperfection.87
The masculine metaphor of castration fears that wholeness, integ-
rity, justice, and freedom are always already lost; the feminine position
84. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra note 43, at 816-19, 903-04 (1999).
85. This is the judgement of Hesiod in his authoritative. account of the myth. Id. at 818.
86. Genesis 3:16.
87. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra note 43, at 904 (citations omitted). Originally,
Pandora's fateful container was an amphora. Following Erasmus's mistranslation, most modem
accounts refer to Pandora's box.
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reveals that, in fact, they haye not yet been achieved, nor could they be.
Imperfection is our lot-and our condition of being.
CONCLUSION
Lacanian theory shows the defects in both normative policy schol-
arship and romanticism-the two dominant modes of thinking in Ameri-
can law schools. As for the latter, the Lacanian concept of the subject's
false autobiography helps explain why a romantic faith in the wholeness
of the subject apart from the law cannot be accepted. We find that
although Pierre Schlag intuits the Lacanian insight of the split subject
castrated by artificial law, he implies a romantic liberal vision of a self-
identical, uncastrated subject who could exist in a mythical state of
nature free from law's corrupting influence.
Lacan teaches otherwise. He suggests that law is a constituent part
of the constitution of the subject. To lay down the law, as Schlag sug-
gests, is to lay down our subjectivity. The law cannot be escaped. Better
to make it our work product, so that we recognize ourselves in the law.
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